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Russia and Carl Schmitt: the hybridity of resistance
in the globalised world
Bohdana Kurylo1
ABSTRACT The rise of state dissidence has challenged the hegemony of Western liber-
alism on the international relations stage. Russia’s ongoing involvement in the Ukraine crisis
is a case in point. Russia’s dissidence threatens not only the already fragile European order,
but also the potency of liberalism as a system of international norms. Hence, a great deal of
attention has been given to trying to determine the possible failures and solutions of global
governance in dealing with Russia. In contrast, this article argues for the need to understand
state resistance from the perspective of the dissenting state. By drawing upon Carl Schmitt’s
inﬂuential critique of globalizing liberalism, the article attempts to analyse what Russia’s
resistance reveals about the subtle mechanisms of global liberal governance. On the basis of
Schmitt’s theory, the article establishes that Russia’s dissidence can be an attempt to pre-
serve state sovereignty and its unique “way of life”, as well as state pluralism on the global
arena. In fact, to eradicate conﬂict, liberal governance attempts to suppress state pluralism as
a potential cause of conﬂict. In the long run, however, this risks provoking radical resistance in
response. The article then analyses the “hybrid” strategy of Russia’s resistance employed in
the Ukraine crisis, based on which it identiﬁes the major weaknesses of liberal governance.
The article concludes that the inadequacy of international law to deal with unconventional
forms of warfare and refusal to acknowledge the possibility of animosity can signiﬁcantly
debilitate liberal governance. This article is published as part of a collection on global
governance.
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Introduction
In the post-war years, the international order becamedominated by the United States and advanced industrialWestern democratic states. The end of the Cold War allowed
liberal governance to spread universally without major opposi-
tion. It was around this time when the notion of “global
governance” came into widespread usage, describing the system
of multilateral institutions and regulatory mechanisms established
to manage international relations and secure peace (Ikenberry,
2011). Nowadays, however, the global hegemony of liberal
governance is being shaken by the rise of dissident states. From
India’s refusal to accept the Non-Proliferation Treaty to Britain’s
decision to leave the European Union—the forms and impact of
state resistance vary. While some states only seek to negotiate new
bargains, the intentions of others, such as North Korea, are an
apparent menace to the international order.
The modern form of state dissidence is best exempliﬁed by
Russia, threatening the status quo established in the post-Cold
War era by challenging the hegemony of the liberal order
(European Union Committee, 2015). The election of Vladimir
Putin ended the reluctant Russo-Western cooperation and set a
pattern of dissidence against the international liberal norms
through military aggression in Georgia and Syria. The evolution
of Russia’s version of state dissidence is exempliﬁed by the
clandestine Russian attempt to destabilize the Ukrainian govern-
ment (Trenin, 2014). Having annexed Crimea in March 2014,
Russia has given indirect support (for example, supply of
armaments) to the militant insurgencies in Donetsk and Luhansk
(Sakwa, 2015a; Snetkov and Lanteigne, 2015). Russia also
deployed around 30,000 troops along the Ukrainian border,
sparking fears of future invasion (Tsygankov, 2015). This article
does not intend to go into details of the Ukrainian events, as it
rather seeks to analyse global liberal governance through Russia’s
dissidence.
A number of studies have already analysed the threats that
Russia poses to the established international order (Karatnycky
and Motyl, 2009; Herpen, 2014; Jahn, 2015; Sakwa, 2015a;
Shevtsova, 2015; Laruelle, 2016). Many of them have proposed
some useful solutions to prevent further escalation of the conﬂict
(Motyl, 2014; Wilson, 2014; Alexandrova-Arbatova, 2015;
Crosston, 2015; Tsygankov, 2015; Veebel, 2015; Haukkala,
2016). However, immediate events have enjoyed signiﬁcantly
more attention than their wider implications, calling for a deeper
analysis. Furthermore, more research needs to be done on the
impact of globalizing liberalism from the standpoint of the
modern state. Speaking of Russia’s dissidence from the perspec-
tive of global governance risks presenting Russia as a deviation
from the norm. Rather than determining whether Russia is a
traditionalist and expansionist power intending to reconquer its
former lands, this article argues that the governance-centric
approach to state resistance occludes the bigger picture.
Therefore, the article turns to German philosopher Carl
Schmitt (1888–1985) and his critique of liberal governance.
Mainly because of his support of the Nazi party and anti-
Semitism, the twentieth century witnessed Schmitt’s work being
largely neglected by scholars of global governance. Nonetheless,
the revival of Schmittian scholarship in the last two decades
suggests that the full potential of his ideas is yet to be discovered
(Dyrberg, 2009; Teschke, 2011). Like the modern dissident state,
Schmitt experienced Western governance from the receiving end
—both in the case of his year-long internment by the American
forces for participation in the Nazi “conspiracy to wage aggressive
war” and in the wider post-war context of West Germany (Drolet,
forthcoming). Several authors have already drawn the parallels
between Schmitt and Russia, suggesting that one may be useful
for understanding another. One of the forerunners, Grigorov
(1997) suggested that Russia’s constitution was based on the
Schmittian perception of authority. More recently, Filippov
(2008) and Baumgarth (2015) referred to Schmitt to understand
Russia’s domestic policy and the foundations behind Vladimir
Putin’s presidency. In contrast, Russia’s foreign policy has
enjoyed comparatively less attention. Only Auer (2015: 967)
incorporated Schmitt into his study of the revival of Russian
imperialism, which he classiﬁed as “the most serious challenge to
Europe’s peace since the end of the Cold War”.
As dissidence is always a correlative notion, the holistic
analysis of state dissidence should also examine the hegemonic
system to which it applies (Hamati-Ataya, 2011). This article
argues that, by analysing the dissidence of Russia, it is possible to
uncover the subtle mechanisms of global liberal governance.
Following a synopsis of the aims of global governance, it attempts
to convey Schmitt’s view of international politics and the dangers
of liberal de-politicization of the international realm. On the basis
of Schmitt, this article identiﬁes the defence of the sovereignty of
the state, its way of life and pluralism of international order as
possible justiﬁcations for the resistance of the modern state.
Indeed, by undermining state sovereignty, globalizing liberalism
attempts to suppress difference of states as a potential cause of
conﬂict. In turn, this risks provoking radical resistance in the long
run. Most importantly, the article demonstrates that state
resistance is important for understanding the weaknesses of
global governance. The analysis of Russia’s “hybrid” strategy of
resistance shows that the over-reliance on law and the inability to
identify its enemies make global liberal governance vulnerable to
exceptional cases of resistance. After all, liberalism might be
strengthened from reﬂecting on state dissidence and developing a
strategic response to deal with its dangers.
Eliminating conﬂict in the “post-political” age
The disappearance of the Westphalian relationship of “just
enmity” has been thought of as one of the main strengths of the
“post-political” global governance. Based on the inﬂuential
analysis by Mouffe (2000), the concept of the “post-political”
refers to governmental practices that are premised on consensus,
rather than struggle, as the basis of the liberal international order.
Its proponents often emphasize that, “even though liberal states
have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal
states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in
war with one another” (Doyle, 1983: 213). The harmony of
international relationships derives from the general understand-
ing that peace and cooperation bring more beneﬁts than their
absence. The phenomenon of enmity appears only in the context
of something to be eventually neutralized or turned into
friendship. The establishment of the European Union, democratic
states and the transatlantic security cooperation signiﬁes the
movement towards the concept of international “friendship”
(Prozorov, 2006: 86).
The point of departure for the liberal project to eliminate war is
its belief in the sanctity of the freedom of the individual (Doyle,
1983). Despite acknowledging difference on the surface, liberals
see individuals to be fundamentally uniform in the sense that all
are concerned with self-preservation and prosperity. Conse-
quently, all “share an interest in peace, and should want war only
as an instrument to bring about peace” (Owen, 2000: 344). This is
connected to Nader’s (1990) belief that conﬂict is a feature of a
necessarily unhealthy, outdated and dysfunctional society. The
behaviour of the non-liberal “other” is perceived as inherently
irrational. Nader’s concept of “harmony ideology” argues that
aspiring for harmony and minimizing confrontation brings real
harmony and security in the world. The apparent condition for
such ultimate harmony seems to be a world consisting of only
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liberal democratic states, for only they can represent the actual
will of their citizens to live in peace and stability.
In addition to the discursive de-legitimization of conﬂict, there
is its increasing “moralization” (Mouffe, 2000; Prozorov, 2006;
Garsten and Jacobsson, 2011). The tendency of moral evaluation
of codes of conduct has been intensiﬁed since the Second World
War, when the concept of the enemy started having an inherently
negative connotation. The most apparent example of this was the
creation of International War Crimes Tribunals after the Second
World War and the new category of “crimes against humanity”.
Since then, the notion of humanity has become the liberal raison
d’etat corroborated by the United Nations Charter. Any obstacle
—whether war, authoritarianism or anarchy—becomes illegiti-
mate by deﬁnition.
A consensual model of politics suppresses the possibility of
dissent by purifying the political agenda from potentially
contentious issues. The expression of frustrations, antagonisms
and disagreements occur outside of legitimate channels. Usually,
such dissidence is spontaneous, short-lived and unable to pose a
signiﬁcant threat to global governance. However, the attitude
towards dissidence changes when it comes to dissidence of the
state in the international arena. Non-liberal states are viewed as
potentially dangerous, since they may seek to usurp other states.
Thus, a considerable emphasis falls at the pre-emption of conﬂict
and state misbehaviour.
Global police power plays a distinct pre-emptive role in global
governance, signiﬁcantly weakening the regulatory capacity of the
state (Ryan, 2013). The global police can be understood as “a
supranational investigative body with enforcement powers” that
maintains good international order (Bowling and Sheptycki,
2012: 130). It operates through different transnational regulatory
bodies, such as NGOs, international organizations, states, public
and private actors, united by the common task of maintaining
global security and liberal order. The idea of a global police takes
its origins from the notion of a “good neighbourhood”, which was
then transformed into “one neighbourhood” and embodied in the
creation of United Nations (Ryan, 2013: 448). The actions of the
global police do not depend on democratic approval, and there is
no counter-power that can legitimately scrutinize them (Jennar,
2004). This is sometimes called “governance without govern-
ment”, which, as Garsten and Jacobsson (2011: 425) clarify, is
governance through “steering” from heterarchical power centres.
In contrast to the conventional understanding of police, the
regulatory modes of the global police are not limited to rule-
setting, but also include monitoring and “soft law”—quasi-legal
guidelines and codes of practice (Ibid.). Rather than being
constraining, various centres of the global policing gradually
encourage and discipline states to frame their policies in
accordance with global models (Meyer, 2007: 263). In the post-
Cold War era, guiding Russia and many East European states
towards the liberal future became one such example (Ryan, 2013).
In the case of an international threat, the enforcing capacities
of global policing depend on the pre-emptively formed consensus
against speciﬁc activities that are recognized to endanger
international security. The dissenting actor faces criminalization
of their behaviour, its universal condemnation and general
isolation. According to Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter
(1945), if the threat is not liquidated, the UN may choose to take
more forceful action. Various governmental bodies unite in using
“diplomatic pressure or incentives, economic measures or
coercive action, often in combination” (Feinstein and Slaughter,
2004: 145). In the case of the current crisis in Ukraine, the pre-
emptive measures taken against Russian aggression were the
economic sanctions imposed against Russia’s major ofﬁcials. The
EU and NATO also suspended their cooperation with Russia,
aiming to achieve its political and economic isolation.
Placing global policing into the wider implications of the “post-
political” global order, the thesis of a leading International
Relations theorist, Wendt (2003), on the inevitability of a world
state illustrates a self-evident conclusion of liberal governance.
According to Wendt, the most formidable inadequacy of the
current collective security system is its voluntary status, which is
unable to eradicate the possibility of conﬂict completely. Its
member-states still retain their sovereignty and are likely to
disobey when they ﬁnd it beneﬁcial (Wendt, 2003). Thanks to a
much stronger capacity of enforcement, a world state would
ensure against the instability of collective security. Together with
it comes the necessity to eliminate all the possibilities of state
dissidence. Yet, Wendt (2003: 523) wonders whether the purpose
of retention of sovereignty is anything else than “retention of the
right to decide, unilaterally, to revoke an actor’s recognized status
and possibly kill them”. As Prozorov (2006: 87) argues, the
ultimate goal of the liberal project is the disappearance of the
international as such and creation of “a self-immanent system
without an outside”.
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism
Schmitt founds his critique of the liberal international order on
his concept of “the political”. For the purposes of clarity, “the
political” is deﬁned here as the struggle that roots any given socio-
political order, and from which basic governmental principles
derive. Starting from Schmitt’s early writings, such as Political
Theology ([1922] 2005) and The Concept of the Political ([1927]
2007b), until his more mature works, such as Nomos of the Earth
([1950] 2003), he insists that the core of the political is the
struggle between friends and enemies. The political should be
distinguished from all other spheres of human activity (moral,
aesthetical or economic), as the friend-enemy antinomy con-
stitutes an independent criterion of judgement and action. Put
differently, the political enemy does not need to be evil or ugly to
remain “the other”. As the political is also the strongest
antagonism, everything becomes divided according to the
friend-enemy distinction should conﬂict arise. Accounting for
the political as a domain of struggle shows that war is unavoidable
in international relations. It is not to say that the political is
nothing more than a state of war, but it, nonetheless, remains an
existential possibility.
Reﬂecting on global liberal governance, Schmitt criticizes its
attempts to subdue the political to the rule of law. He confronts
the liberal tendency to escape conﬂict and to shield behind the
fragile foundations of liberal normativism and legal formalism.
Liberal politics is but the ignorance and negation of politics, its
eradication. As Schmitt puts it, there is “no liberal politics,
only a liberal critique of politics. The systematic theory of
liberalism concerns almost solely the internal struggle against the
power of the state” (Schmitt: 70). However, as the most extreme
antagonism, the political sources its energy literally from
everywhere and cannot be eradicated. Therefore, liberalism
succeeds only in temporarily masking the political through
non-political language.
Schmitt’s underlying concern is that the dominance of secular
liberalism and rational individualism can be detrimental for
sustaining the meaningfulness of life. In his essay given as a
lecture, “The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations”
([1929] 2007a: 95), Schmitt expresses his concern that the
“soulless mechanism” of modern technocratic governance will
cause the decay of spiritual life. Inspired by Max Weber’s analysis
of “rationalization”, he claims that modern technology and
bureaucracy replace human action and thought, causing increas-
ing “disenchantment”. Strauss (1991) rightfully highlights the
presence of morals in Schmitt’s theory, as it is ignorance of the
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masses which Schmitt views as the most corrupting force. If
through participation in politics one learns responsibility and
reason, then, without the political, one ceases to be a human
(Darby, 2000). The logical outcome of such conditions “is a
society that is held together by the market place, where isolated
individuals as competitors exchange commodities” (Turner, 2002:
106). In short, Schmitt fears that the sweeping blow of
globalization and technocratic governance will engender a society
full of neutralized and vegetative bodies.
On the international level, de-politicization negates the
existence of a struggle between groups over what is right.
Contrary to encouraging war between states, Schmitt claims that
political violence cannot be justiﬁed unless it is a response to a
threat to a group’s “way of life”. As Warren (1988: 35) states, to
deﬁne the political “only in terms of conﬂict, would miss its
distinctive qualities and potentials”. In the situations “when, at
least potentially, one ﬁghting collectivity of people confronts a
similar collectivity”, the friend-enemy distinction encourages
citizens to take responsibility and sacriﬁce life for their form
of existence (Schmitt: 28). It ensures against, what Warren
(1988: 31) calls “a Nietzschean world”, or, in simpliﬁed terms, a
nihilistic world in which states cannot preserve the mean-
ingfulness of life of their communities. Without the international
political space, communities would be unable to maintain their
values, principles and beliefs. As McLoughlin (2009: 143) states,
“liberalism negates [politics] […] as a locus of value and reduces
public political concerns to private moral or economic ones”. The
political with its friend-enemy distinction holds an intrinsic
ethical value because it gives meaning to the existence of the
international.
Since “the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the
political”, Schmitt ([1927] 2007b: 19) grants the state with the role
of organizing, managing and channelling political conﬂict. As put
by McLoughlin (2009: 141), “the ability to decide for a substantive
value and to realise it within the world […] raises individuals up
out of the pursuit of their individual interests”, and unites them
into a true political community—the state. Thus, the state has to
be autonomous from all social institutions and interests to be able
to make most suitable decisions in life-and-death situations to
preserve its way of life. It requires a strong sovereign who would
represent a uniﬁed will of the people and remove internal
opposition. Globalization of the political as the strongest
antagonism further reinforces Schmitt’s emphasis on the need
for state sovereignty.
Russia: view from the receiving end of global governance
Recovering sovereignty. Inheriting Schmitt’s view of the political,
Russia’s political identity has been largely based on differentiating
itself from others (Tsygankov, 2013). Rejecting the concept of
“global democracy”, Russia has introduced its own alternative
concept of “sovereign democracy” (Herpen, 2014: 57), for public
good is a relational term that depends on a concrete situation
(Oates, 2007). Sovereign democracy implies that the state alone
can set the criteria of democracy for itself, protecting its unique
statehood against the intrusion by the world police power.
According to this theory, the aggregation of internal consensus
and stability are necessary for the state to be able to defend itself
in the case of external threats. Thus, the Russian political system
places state sovereignty above the rule of law.
Since no juridico-political order can exist without an enforcing
authority, the president is given an unquestionable authority. This
conviction guides most of the decisions of the main party, United
Russia, as much as the overriding majority of other parties (Ibid.).
Vladimir Putin’s authority equally prevails in the upper and the
lower houses of the parliament, the judiciary and the countless
“backdoor” meetings and rigged elections (Motyl, 2016). Electoral
fraud and manipulated media work hard to eliminate any chances
of political opposition. Russia’s legal system is not inoperative,
but serves only those who are willing to abandon their animosities
and unite in strengthening the state. After all, following Schmitt,
the Russian government considers its opponents to be by
deﬁnition outside the state law (Grigorov, 1997).
Moreover, what the West deﬁnes as a neo-imperial “aggrand-
isement of state power” (Herpen, 2014: 111) and “war against
Ukraine” (Goble, 2016: 37), the Russian state perceives as the
reconstruction of its unrestored unity (Tolz, 1998; Laruelle, 2016).
For Russia, the transition to democracy and adaptation to the
liberal rules of international conduct became negatively associated
with losing state sovereignty (Fischer, 2012). Since the times of
Kievan Rus’, Ukraine and Russia have battled and identiﬁed
themselves against common enemies. Russia views the Ukrainian
land as, borrowing Lukyanov’s (2010: 19) words, “a natural part
of the country’s historical and cultural core”. By supporting
regime change in Ukraine and its integration with the EU, the
West is thought to be meddling in Russia’s “legitimate interests”.
Accordingly, through the political and military enlargements of
the EU and NATO, the West has been trying to weaken its
sovereignty by expanding its inﬂuence closer to Russia’s borders
(Rajan and Rumer, 2015; Sakwa, 2015a).
Therefore, Russia perceived the overthrow of the government
in Kyiv as a state of exception that, by extension, threatened its
sovereignty. The state of exception can be characterized by a
breakdown of order; an unpredictable and uncontrollable
situation when norms, legal rules and ethics lose their validity
(McLoughlin, 2009). According to Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 5),
sovereignty belongs to whoever decides on the exception and
whoever is capable of dealing with it: “Sovereign is he who
decides on the exception”. The sovereign decision cannot be
foreseen by the constitution. In fact, it must be constitutionally
exceptional (Grigorov, 1997: 275). From this perspective, the
annexation of Crimea was Russia’s response to the nationalist
takeover, which threatened the Russian minority living in
Ukraine. In addition, the actions of the new Ukrainian
government, such as the repeal of the law that made Russian
the second ofﬁcial language, endangered the historical and
cultural interconnectedness of two peoples. This could also
endanger Russia’s “fabric of internal values” and, thus, its way of
life (Tsygankov, 2015: 293). Consequently, the Russian state chose
to restore the order by positioning itself superior to law and
interfering in the crisis.
In the West, most of the criticism of the Russian state has come
from a rather top-down perspective of liberal governance. For
instance, Herpen (2014: 57) confronts Russia’s coercive quest for
power, the absence of morals and endorsement of the doctrine of
social Darwinism, according to which the strong ought to
dominate the weak because of the very fact that they are stronger.
According to Bugajski (2009: 15), “instead of confronting and
expunging the Soviet past, the Putinists […] diverted their
attention toward a new enemy, the rapacious West evidently
intent on dismembering Russia”. Discussing the “paradoxes” of
Russian politics, Luzhkov (2003: 156), also condemns Russia’s
foreign policy for following “the futile and mainly fabricated”
rationale of “who to be friends with”. Nonetheless, the question
arises: why would the state even think of confronting a signiﬁcant
part of itself and, in doing so, weakening its legitimacy before the
people? The question is especially striking in international
relations, where sovereignty is vital for state survival in the wake
of the globalization of the political. Taking Russia’s perspective
shows that the relationship between the state and liberal
governance is inherently problematic because liberalism favours
only weak states.
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The sanctity of the way of life. Examining the arguments for the
incontestable powers of the state, the ﬁrst question that comes to
mind is to what extent the public good depends on state sover-
eignty. Indeed, from the liberal pluralist perspective, the indivi-
dual necessarily needs to be freed from the state. From this
perspective, it is not logical for Russian citizens to be proud of the
state aggrandizing power because it potentially amounts to the
state exerting more coercion. Nonetheless, the perspective of the
state helps understand the concept of liberty not as an exclusive
domain of the individual, but as something that can be attributed
to the political community as a whole. Here, the state appears as
the embodiment of the overarching unity of differences within
civil society (Rasch, 2000). This unity constitutes its unique way
of life, which the state has to defend on the international level. As
stated in Russia’s National Security Strategy, the state policy
should be directed towards “the reinforcement of the role of the
state as guarantor of the security of the individual” (Security
Council of the Russian Federation, 2009). According to Russia’s
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (cited in Makarychev and
Morozov, 2011: 362), “each country is supposed to represent its
own interests, instead of delegating its functions to EU, NATO
and other international organisations”. This explains the citizens’
pride in the state gaining more strength, as “freedom for Russia”
already ensures individual freedom and, thus, stands before it
(Putin, 2014a).
But does state sovereignty still matter in the liberal world where
the individual difference is being ever-increasingly accentuated
and cherished? The answer that Schmitt gives is a deﬁnite “yes”.
The reason for this is that liberal governance fosters global
uniformity and hierarchy of values, while shielding behind the
preservation of difference on the molecular level. More precisely,
Schmitt objects to the attempts to establish a global consensus
over the universality of liberal values. In his concise piece entitled
The Tyranny of Values ([1959] 1996b), Schmitt develops a
political critique of values, linking it to his earlier remarks on
global governance. Its main point is that value has a natural
tendency to continuously valuate, and that this valuation is
not possible without simultaneously de-valuating. As such,
“[w]hoever sets a value, takes position against a disvalue by that
very action” (Schmitt). Wendt (2003: 525) insists that liberal
governance does not foster uniformity because the limitless
tolerance and neutrality of viewpoints allow the state to preserve
its individuality. However, the narrative of “particularism within
universalism” (Ibid.) eventually turns into a struggle for existence
between the hegemonic and peripheral systems, for “[t]he
valuation pressure of the value is irresistible” (Schmitt). In this
case, the notion of humanity as a community of universal values
—namely tolerance, neutrality, the rule of law, human rights and
free market—is detrimental because it supersedes the value
systems of individual states.
Schmitt’s critique resembles the “value empire” narrative,
which has been a prevailing critique of the EU among the Russian
elites in the last two decades (Averre, 2009: 1690). According to
Fischer (2012) and Sakwa (2015b), the EU expansion is an
imperialist move to overtake Russia’s sphere of inﬂuence through
entrenching liberal values. Hence, the Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov (cited in Fischer, 2012: 39) asked: “We are accused
of trying to have spheres of inﬂuence. What is the Eastern
Partnership? Is it a sphere of inﬂuence, we would like to
understand?” Therefore, Russia fears that it will no longer be
responsible for its way of life, which would be imposed on it by an
external force, by extension, disciplining its people (Odysseos,
2007). As Meyer (2007: 264) claims, good citizenship of states
depends on how well they serve their “people”. In turn, “these
‘people’ are deﬁned in standardised ways” (Ibid.). In so doing,
liberal governance stands by its claim to foster political plurality
only insofar as plurality takes place within the already predeﬁned
umbrella of difference.
Defending international pluralism? As show above, there is a
strong correlation between the sovereignty of the state and the
preservation of its way of life. Moreover, the two are closely
intertwined when it comes to the ﬁnal justiﬁcation of state dis-
sidence—the recovery of pluralism within the global order of
autonomous states. Herein, Schmitt envisages the international
order to be a pluriverse rather than a universe, representing a
plurality of interests on the global scale. As put by Rasch (2000:
12), Schmitt wants to begin “with a unity of difference to attain a
difference of unities”. International politics is essentially a space
of difference, which are often irreconcilable. Thus, the possibility
of conﬂict between states cannot be completely eradicated.
However, as political struggle sustains the meaningfulness of life,
there is nothing wrong with sovereign states asserting their power
and vitality against one another (Schmitt). In the case of dis-
agreement, it is natural for states to group themselves into
“friends” and “enemies”. Some states may choose to stay neutral,
but this does not make them “impartial” judges, since judging
also constitutes participating (Rasch, 2000). In such a way, wars
would be waged according to the ethics of raison d’état on how to
best defend one’s way of life.
Nevertheless, in the modern world order, the devaluation of
different “ways of life” is done with a globalizing force. In
addition to the waves of de-politicization coming from the centre
of global governance, the negation of difference from below
causes the “abyss of total devaluation”, the same nihilistic world
which Schmitt (1959 [1996b]) fears . However, nihilism can easily
turn into a dangerous force once there appears an actor or a
group “strong enough to master the new technology” and chair
the new governance (Schmitt, 2007a: 94). Schmitt’s ([1978] 1987:
80) main fear is the transformational of international politics into
“a world police power”, where a particular group claims to
represent humanity at large. Schmitt (cited in Petito, 2007: 109)
presumes that the Cold War was decisive in this sense, for its
“victor [was doomed to become] the world’s sole sovereign”.
Returning to Wendt’s (2003) idea of a “world state”, the price of
world peace is the elimination of the international as space where
it is still possible to resist the totality of one order (Prozorov,
2006: 88).
With the beginning of Putin’s presidency, the emphasis on the
drecovery of pluralism within the international system has settled
deep into Russia’s foreign policy agenda (Snetkov and Lanteigne,
2015). Putin (2007) has criticized the global liberal governance for
being “a world of one master, one sovereign”. Consequently, the
modern international order is not the result of the democratic will
of the people, but of a club-like conglomerate of liberal states.
Thus, Russia depicts itself to be a courageous bastion against the
imperialist tendencies of Western liberalism, especially its
humanitarian militarism, political unilateralism and undermining
of state sovereignty. It aims to undermine the dominance of the
Western liberalism chaired by the United States by transforming
the “unipolar” international order into a “multipolar” one (Ibid.).
According to one of the most well-known radical right
theoreticians in Russia, Alexandr Dugin (cited in Laruelle, 2016:
8), Russia’s global mission lies in “the incarnation of the quest for
a historical alternative to Atlanticism”.
The Russian case shows that resistance is concomitant to the
de-politicization and neutralization of the international order,
calling for an even stronger suppression of difference. As
Prozorov (2006: 90) explains, resistance is inevitable, “as the
Other is certain to resist its violent inclusion into the homeland of
liberal humanity”. To maintain its absolute authority, global
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governance decides to “push the discrimination of the opponent
into the abyss” by abusing the universality of liberal principles
(Schmitt: 321). Schmitt ([1963] 2004) continues his analysis in
Theory of the Partisan, stating that the opponents of the
global hegemony of liberalism become seen as inhuman, a non-
value. They are not recognized as an enemy, but are trans-
formed into “a disturber of peace” and thereby “an outlaw of
humanity” (Schmitt: 79). The conﬂation of politics with morality
portrays the political enemies of Western liberalism as morally
corrupt “criminals”, calling for the global police intervention
(Bessant, 2015: 335). War is no longer a legitimate act of state
sovereignty to openly promote its interests, but a crime against
humanity.
Therefore, from the perspective of global governance, Russia’s
dissidence is merely a sign of a neo-imperialist state desiring more
power. Its strength and unity are condemned; its weakness is
praised. Accordingly, the main problem with Russia is that it has
failed to borrow liberal values and become a “normal” state
(Luzhkov, 2003: 156). In fact, Russia appears as “a mythical
monster”, which “every time it lies down on the ground and
appears ﬁnally defeated, it rises to power again” (Herpen, 2014:
15). It is a monster because, as Shevtsova (2014: 74) claims,
“instead of trying to join Western civilization, Russia is now
striving to become its antithesis”. It necessarily needs to be turned
into a liberal democracy and embrace the technocratic govern-
ance in the name of an external legitimizing authority. If, despite
the recommendations of global police, its resistance continues, it
will no longer be a form of dissent, but a criminal act.
The more total global policing becomes, the higher is the
chance for the most extreme violence against the opponents of
the post-political international order. By claiming universal
validity, global liberal governance does not become “the opposite
of force, but a force that outlaws opposition” (Rasch, 2000:10).
The struggle for the highest values creates “ever newer, ever
deeper discriminations, criminalisations, and devaluations, until
all non-valuable life has been destroyed” (Schmitt: 94). As put by
Galli and Fay (2010: 6), the notion of universalism “is
discriminatory in and of itself, as it tends to read exception as
error, injustice, immorality, or as the disturbance of unity that has
no right to existence and must, therefore, be removed”. Schmitt
([1929] 2007a: 95) describes this dynamic by saying that “the
most terrible war is pursued in the name of peace, [and] the most
terrible oppression is pursued in the name of freedom”.
Nonetheless, even extreme eradication of opposition does not
mean that resistance disappears, but that it is kept “on hold” or
ﬁnds a different expression. All states are bearers of different ways
of life, which cannot be reconciled simply by uniting them in a
unipolar world order. According to Schmitt (Ibid.: 90), even “in
the new domain, at ﬁrst considered neutral, the antitheses of men
and interests will unfold with a new intensity and become
increasingly sharper”. Despite being built on the principles of
neutrality and objectivity, the new international community is
likely to “become immediately another arena of struggle” (Ibid.).
As Mouffe (2000: 5) explains, the excess of consensus prevents
conﬂict from channelling and causes it to become necessarily
“agonistic”. Globalization is likely to cause resistance to arise with
a new, unprecedented force. However, the radical unity of the
world now means that conﬂict can no longer be contained behind
the state borders. “The old gods rise from their graves and ﬁght
their old battles” right at the centre of the liberal community
(Schmitt). In short, there is a danger of state dissidence
transforming into radical resistance against liberal governance.
Still, there is a clear mismatch between the predictions of
radical resistance and the resistance of Russia. Rather than being a
purely defensive measure, Russia’s resistance is also a project
that it aspires to export to other states. Dugin (cited in Laruelle,
2016: 9) calls for a transformation of “Russian distinctiveness into
a universal model of culture”. Although Russia is not merely an
expansionist state, the desire to expand its sphere of inﬂuence still
is a major motivation for its dissidence. In fact, the belief of the
great majority of Ukrainians that “Ukraine is not Russia”
dismantles any claims that Ukraine is somehow part of the
Russian nation (Kuchma, 2003). After all, it is no longer a
historical friendship founded on ﬁghting common enemies when
one of the “friends” wages a war against the other. Thus, Laruelle
(2016: 9) is right to speak of an apparent contradiction between
Russia’s “exaltation of national distinctiveness” and its “desire for
geopolitical and ideological expansionism and a new messian-
ism”. Nonetheless, despite not being a true defender of a
multipolar world order, Russia’s dissidence, helps expose the
problematic relationship between the state and modern govern-
ance, liberalism and pluralism.
Exceptional case: hybrid resistance
The two-dimensional nature of its dissidence suggests that Russia
is only a half-dissident. On the one hand, it ﬁghts against the
intrusion of hegemonic liberal governance into the domestic life
of states. On the other hand, Russia’s foreign policies position it
as an aspiring world hegemon. Nonetheless, as stated earlier, the
purpose of this article is not to criticize Russia’s behaviour, but to
investigate what it uncovers about global governance. Indeed,
Russia intends not only to free itself from the inﬂuence of liberal
governance, but also to neutralize its hegemony. To achieve it, its
dissidence is structured in such a way as to exploit the
fundamental weaknesses of global liberal governance. Thus,
examining the speciﬁc strategy of state dissidence can help
discover the loopholes in the international order.
Russia’s dissidence during the Ukraine crisis is an exceptional
case in the history of global governance, as it differs from the
usual forms of warfare. The Kremlin’s vague interpretation of the
international law allows it to justify the 2014 annexation of
Crimea by invoking the right of all nations to self-determination
stated in the United Nations Charter, portraying the annexation
as Russia’s response to the “plea” of the people of Crimea (Putin,
2014b). In a similar fashion, Russia distorts the fact of its
involvement in the separatist insurgency in Eastern Ukraine.
However, there is strong evidence that Moscow provides the
separatists with military, logistical and diplomatic support
(Snetkov and Lanteigne, 2015; Lanozska, 2016). Throughout
Ukraine, the Kremlin has also secured support from a pro-
Russian lobby of political forces, which promote Russian interests
through pro-Russian movements (Ukrainian Choice) and parti-
cipation in the parliament (parties such as “Opposition Bloc”,
“Our Land”, “Revival”) (Shevtsova, 2015). Nonetheless, Russia
never recognized the referendums in Eastern Ukraine. Neither
did it formally invade the territory of Ukraine. Consequently,
international law lacks enough factual evidence to lay formal
charges against the Russian state.
The innovation of Russia’s resistance lies in the implementa-
tion of hybrid techniques of warfare, which have departed from
relying on direct military force. “Hybrid warfare” can be
understood as the use of military force while claiming otherwise,
which is supplemented with the weaponisation of information,
ideas, business and other areas of life (Pomerantsev and Weiss,
2014; Shevtsova, 2015; Lanozska, 2016). Simultaneously, the
Kremlin continues to emphasize the importance of abiding by
international law and using diplomacy rather than force to
resolve conﬂicts (Snetkov and Lanteigne, 2015). Such camouﬂa-
ging allows the Russian state to pursue its interests and bypass the
normative principles of liberal governance. Whereas it is easy to
criminalize an overt aggression, the major international
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institutions, such as UN General Assembly and the UN Security
Council, are powerless when it comes to hybrid warfare.
The technique of hybrid warfare shows the insufﬁciency of
international law in dealing with exceptional cases. There is a
strong correlation between the liberal fear of conﬂict and its
attempts at de-politicization of the international realm. To
eliminate the possibility of resistance to its global hegemony,
liberal governance tries to neutralize difference between states by
imposing on them the rule of law. In the process, however, the
system becomes a hostage of its own rules. By excluding the space
for difference, it loses the ﬂexibility necessary for dealing with
exceptional cases. Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 13) considers the power
of law to be limited to the periods when the world enjoys peace
and stability, a situation he calls “a homogeneous medium”.
However, the onset of exceptional circumstances turns liberal
constitutionalism into a mirage, for “[t]here is no norm which
could be applied to a situation of chaos” (Ibid.). Thus, Schmitt
([1963] 2003: 220) warns against the liberal reliance on law,
which merely is “a collection of somewhat valid norms” that have
no relation to political reality. In the case of the Ukraine conﬂict,
there is simply no such provision in international law that could
prosecute hybrid warfare.
In addition to the camouﬂaged warfare directly on Ukrainian
soil, the danger of Russia’s hybrid warfare rises because of its
ability to permeate the Western space. Russia widely exploits the
notion of freedom of information to spread disinformation across
the West. It sponsors pro-Russian media outlets in the West and
uses social media to deliver its interpretation of events, which
often totally reverses the Western perspective (Pomerantsev and
Weiss, 2014). In the United Kingdom, for instance, the European-
wide news channel, Euronews, has fewer viewers than the pro-
Russian channel, Russia Today (Shevtsova, 2015: 32). Weaponi-
sation of information demonstrates the weaknesses of one of the
main liberal principles of governance—freedom of information
and expression. In the meantime, Russia is placing new limits on
the Internet content and media outlets with foreign capital inside
Russia. From 2012, the Russian Federal Security Service can
demand to erase all web-content deemed “harmful” even without
a court order (Ibid.). According to the idea of the sovereignty of
one’s way of life, there is nothing extraordinary about the state
having its interpretation of reality. However, the acceptance of
Russian propaganda within the liberal community is a prime
example of the self-destructive effects of liberal governance
(Miazhevich, 2014).
Furthermore, Russia incites internal divisions within the liberal
states. While demanding that its elites repatriate their foreign
assets, Russia funds and creates alliances with Eurosceptic think
tanks and political parties in Europe. The French National Front,
the UK Independence Party and German Die Linke Party have all
been outspoken defenders of Russia’s foreign policies (Shevtsova,
2015; Lanozska, 2016). Some of the main NATO and EU
members, such as Germany, France, Greece and Italy, have also
been ready to overlook Russia’s dissidence because of their strong
economic ties with Russia (Mankoff, 2013: 265). Such “accom-
modationist” positions are extremely counterproductive for the
liberal community, as they only facilitate Russia’s dissidence and
discredit the decision-making powers of the world sovereign.
In effect, hybrid warfare is part of Russia’s wider project of
“hybrid resistance” used to undermine liberal governance. The
main characteristic of hybrid resistance is the presence of a silent
dissenter, which enters the hegemonic system only to gradually
undermine it by using its own rules. The focus of liberalism has
always been on assimilating everybody into its way of life, aiming
to eliminate potential conﬂict. In fact, Goble (2016: 38) still
praises the liberal “ability to integrate outsiders”. However, as
mentioned earlier, the attempts to include every state into the
liberal international community do not eliminate resistance, but
rather agonizes it further in the long term. It becomes more
difﬁcult to control internal dissidence, as the distinction between
the Self and the Other disappears (Prozorov, 2006). The result of
the liberal pretence of not having the Other is that the nature of
the opponent remains unclear. As Bugajski (2009: 17) warned,
“much of the West does not understand the kind of threat that
Russia poses and is not actively engaged in countering” it.
The strategy of hybrid resistance had helped Russia to learn the
weak spots of the liberal international order long before the start
of the Ukraine conﬂict. Indeed, the post-Cold War euphoria of
the “end of ideology” weakened the vigilance of the West in
relation to Russia. The belief in Russia as an “honest” partner
survived through different frictions—the Chechen Wars, the gas
wars with Ukraine and the Russo-Georgian War. In its strategy of
resistance, Russia did not take the position of the enemy of the
West. It entered the “global homeland” only to resist it from
within. For decades, Russia has upheld a formal democratic
image, simulated adherence to international liberal standards and
claimed to be a partner of the West. The “liberal dress-up game”
brought a notable openness throughout the West towards
Russia’s participation in liberal multilateral institutions (Ibid.:
22). The 1990s alone witnessed the acceptance of Russia into the
Council of Europe and the G7 (later becoming G8), as well as the
signing of agreements with the European Union and NATO. As
Putin (2014b) remarks, Russia and the West now “belong to the
same civilization”.
Internal dissidence is difﬁcult to eradicate since the outsider
has already become part of the community, making its members
dependent on itself. Nowadays, the mere fact of the possession of
Security Council veto power by Russia constrains global decision-
making. The 1992 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, which permits Russia to possess nuclear weapons, is
enough to install fear of a nuclear war across the West. Because of
the economic interconnectedness with Russia, global policing
does not dare to impose truly harsh sanctions (Mankoff, 2013).
Russia is aware of this, and, thus, it aims to eventually conclude a
deal with the West that would force the Ukrainian government to
accept a “reorganization” of its land. Indeed, in the name of
conﬂict neutralisation, the West is likely to eventually compro-
mise its values and hope that concessions could appease Russia
and return to the status quo.
Therefore, understood in Schmitt’s sense, the failure to pre-
emptively make a clear friend-enemy distinction is another
weakness of global liberal governance. For Schmitt, the will-
ingness to face conﬂict is more beneﬁcial than its deferment.
Contrary to being afraid of war, he claims it to be a necessary part
of establishing relationships between states. Galli and Fay (2010:
5) also suggest that conﬂict can be “a form of reciprocal
recognition” of each state’s sovereignty. Facing the enemy seems
to be even more pertinent once global governance realises the
vicious circle, into which its desire to escape conﬂict ensnares it. It
tries to neutralize difference as the root cause of conﬂict by
bringing every state into the liberal community, but provokes
stronger resistance in the end. After all, despite the endless
discussions in assemblies, the liberal reality does not become any
more peaceful (Hirst, 1999).
More realistically, however, the lessons that one may take from
Schmitt’s critique are not as straightforward as suspending the
rule of law, declaring one to be the enemy and entering an open
confrontation. Contrary to the return to the pre-war state of
international enmity, the friend-enemy distinction can be
understood as stronger vigilance when it comes to outsiders of
the liberal community. Furthermore, precisely because of its
ambiguous nature, Russia’s resistance calls for a more subtle
solution than an open confrontation. Rather than legislating on
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the exception, the urgent task of liberal governance is to make the
international law and its enforcement more adaptable to hybrid
warfare. Together with exposing the lack of ﬂexibility of
international law, hybrid dissidence also points at the limitations
of a predominantly military approach. Indeed, since the start of
the Ukraine crisis, NATO has increased its military exercises and
strengthened its high readiness capabilities (Lanozska, 2016).
While the military approach is effective in preventing large-scale
military attacks, hybrid warfare involves only minimal violence,
the usage of which it can easily deny and conceal. Moreover, the
international liberal order needs to confront pro-Russian
advocates within itself that prevent it from agreeing on a
coherent policy towards Russia (Mankoff, 2013). The West needs
to reconsider whether propaganda aimed to undermine its unity
and conceal the truth can legitimately be defended as freedom of
speech. The ﬁnal lesson that can be extracted from Schmitt’s
critique of liberal governance is that the security of “friends” is
crucial for the security of oneself. Therefore, the sovereignty of
Ukraine should not be compromised by accepting Russia’s
annexation of Ukrainian lands regardless of the beneﬁts of
temporary paciﬁcation it might bring.
Conclusion
This article was guided by the belief that our understanding of
global governance is incomplete without the consideration of the
dynamics between the giving and receiving ends. The aggression
of the Russian state during the Ukraine conﬂict has brought most
of the focus to Russia’s behaviour, or rather its misbehaviour. The
explanations have varied from Russia’s domestic problems, its
expansionist appetites to simply the desire for international
recognition. However, it is questionable whether those explana-
tory approaches truly capture the perspective of the receiving end
of global governance, when Russia is readily viewed as the deviant
actor in this conﬁguration. Thus, by considering the theoretical
input of Carl Schmitt, this article took the standpoint of the
dissenting state to problematize global governance.
Schmitt shows that the proliferation of liberal regimes and
international organizations is certainly not the only means
through which global governance attempts to achieve world
peace. A much greater role is played by certain de-politicizing
techniques aimed at suppressing differences between states as the
root causes of conﬂict. In this case, the resistance of the modern
state comes in response to the weakening of its sovereignty,
devaluation of its way of life and imposition of a uniform
international order. Herein, however, global governance under-
estimates the nature of international politics, which is founded
upon a plurality of different visions of life. As difference and
conﬂict are interconnected, the political is the strongest
antagonism, which means that de-politicization results in
resistance. The more global governance attempts to eradicate
the “abnormal” behaviour, the more radical resistance it
engenders.
Insofar as state dissidence reﬂects the identity of the system, it
also reﬂects the identity of the dissident. Likewise, the resistance
of the Russian state extends beyond measures of self-defence and
arises as an attempt of a competing system to spread its way of
life. Consequently, it is aimed at undermining liberal governance
in the most effective way—from its core. Hybrid warfare used in
the Ukraine crisis cannot destroy liberal governance on its own,
but it does demonstrate that its major weakness lies in the lack of
ﬂexibility of modern law in dealing with exceptional cases. More
signiﬁcantly, hybrid warfare is key to understanding the wider
project of Russia’s strategy of hybrid resistance. The exception-
ality of Russia’s resistance is based on its possession of the
insider’s knowledge of the weaknesses of liberal governance, as
well as its substantial presence in the system of global governance.
Therefore, stronger vigilance when it comes to outsiders of the
liberal community is essential for the very existence of liberal
governance. This article concludes that hybrid challenges require
more subtle solutions than those of military confrontation.
Possible solutions might include modifying international law to
make it more adaptable to non-linear challenges, strengthening
internal unity and prioritizing the security interests of the
“friends” of the international liberal order.
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